Disjunctivism — Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception, edited by Marcus Willaschek, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 5-32.
Reprint of my paper in Philosophical Explorations.
In his paper The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a wellknown – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of disjunctivism; and (iv) to argue that there is a related reason to prefer experiential intentionalism over Martin’s version of disjunctivism.