Edited together with Fiona Macpherson. — Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
The topic of this volume are the different ways in which things can be phenomenally present in perceptual experience. If something is phenomenally present in experience then it features consciously in our experience – that is to say that it makes a subjective difference to our experience. This volume will explore the issues surrounding phenomenal presence in depth. What objects and properties can be phenomenally present as present in our experience and what can be phenomenally present as absent in experience? Are there different ways of being phenomenally present as absent in experience? If so, what are the similarities and differences between them? The range of possible phenomena to consider include: apparent and objective colour, apparent and objective shape, volumes and backsides, amodal completion of figures, grouping phenomena, natural and artifactual kinds, absences, the existence and mind-independence of objects, and the presence of reasons.
The contributors to this volume include John O’Dea, Keith Allen, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Thomas Crowther, Amy Kind, Jerome Dokic, James Stazicker, Craig French, Derek H. Brown and Fabian Dorsch.